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 PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2723 
_____________ 
 
JEANNE ZALOGA; EDWARD ZALOGA, D.O., C.P.A.; 
CORRECTIONAL CARE INC 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF MOOSIC; MOOSIC BOROUGH 
COUNCIL; MOOSIC BOROUGH PLANNING 
COMMISSION; MOOSIC BOROUGH ZONING BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENTS; JOSEPH MERCATILI, Individually 
and in his official capacities as President of Moosic Borough 
Council; JOSEPH DENTE, Individually and in his official 
capacity as Vice President of Moosic Borough Council and 
member of the Moosic Borough Planning Commission;  
THOMAS HARRISON; Individually and in his official 
capacity as Moosic Borough Manager;  BRYAN FAUVER, 
Individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of 
Moosic Borough Planning Commission; JAMES DURKIN, 
Individually and in his official capacity as Moosic Borough 
Zoning and Enforcement Officer; JOHN J. BRAZIL; 
WILLARD HUGHES 
 
Joseph Mercatili, 
            Appellant 
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_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 3-10-cv-02604) 
District Judge:  Hon. Matthew W. Brann 
_______________ 
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July 12, 2016 
 
Before:   SMITH, JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 24, 2016) 
_______________ 
 
Joshua M. Autry   [ARGUED] 
Laverty Faherty Patterson 
225 Market Street – Ste. 304 
P.O. Box 1245 
Harrisburg, PA   17108 
          Counsel for Appellants 
 
Bruce L. Coyer 
Joseph T. Healey   [ARGUED] 
O’Malley Harris Durkin & Perry 
345 Wyoming Avenue 
Scranton, PA   18503 
          Counsel for Appellees 
                                              
 Honorable D. Brooks Smith, United States Circuit Judge for 
the Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on October 1, 
2016 
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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case is an appeal from an interlocutory decision 
denying defendant Joseph Mercatili’s claim to qualified 
immunity.  Dr. Edward Zaloga, who had been engaged in an 
ongoing feud with local government officials, publicly 
opposed Mercatili’s reelection as the President of the Moosic, 
Pennsylvania Borough Council.  Mercatili allegedly retaliated 
against Zaloga by seeking to damage his business interests. 
 
 Zaloga brought this § 1983 suit against several county 
entities and individuals, alleging various constitutional 
violations, including Mercatili’s retaliation.  The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with 
respect to all defendants except Mercatili.  The Court decided 
that Mercatili’s claim to qualified immunity depended on 
disputed facts and would have to be resolved by a jury. 
 
 Mercatili now appeals, arguing that he is entitled to 
qualified immunity because his conduct, even if Zaloga’s 
allegations are true, did not violate clearly established law.  
We agree and will reverse and remand for the District Court 
to grant summary judgment in Mercatili’s favor. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background1  
 The Plaintiffs in this case are Dr. Edward Zaloga and 
Correctional Care, Inc., a medical company he owns and “that 
provides contracted services to correctional facilities.”2  
(Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, M.D. Pa. CA No. 10-2604-
MWB Docket Item (“D.I.”) 156, at 2 ¶ 3.)  Zaloga resides in 
the Borough of Moosic in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.  
At all relevant times, Lackawanna County, through the 
oversight of the Lackawanna County Prison Board, has 
contracted with Correctional Care to provide medical services 
to the Lackawanna County Prison.     
 
 Although the Plaintiffs initially sued the Borough of 
Moosic, the Borough Council, the Borough’s planning 
commission and zoning board, and various Borough officers, 
the only remaining defendant is Mercatili.  The legal friction 
between Zaloga and the Borough originated in disputes 
between the Zaloga family and a tire company that occupied a 
facility immediately adjacent to the Zalogas’ home.  
Frustrated by the Borough’s handling of those disputes, 
                                              
1 For purposes of summary judgment, we recount the 
facts as alleged by the plaintiffs, accepting them as true and 
drawing all factual inferences in their favor.  Scheetz v. The 
Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1991). 
2 Zaloga is the sole shareholder of Correctional Care.  
Although Zaloga’s wife, Jeanne, continues to be listed as a 
plaintiff in the caption of this case, the District Court’s 
June 16, 2015 order dismissed her as a party and no one has 
contested that decision.   
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Zaloga launched political attacks on Mercatili and John 
Segilia – the then-mayor of the Borough (now deceased) – 
publically opposing their nominations for reelection to public 
office.     
 
 About a month later, the Lackawanna County Solicitor 
notified Zaloga that the County intended not to continue its 
contractual arrangement with Correctional Care upon 
expiration of the contract’s term.  The Solicitor also said, 
however, that Correctional Care could compete with other 
health care providers in bidding for a new contract.  It indeed 
did so, but Zaloga’s attorney informed him that, according to 
conversations with a Lackawanna County Prison Board 
member, Segilia and Mercatili were attempting “to block 
[Correctional Care’s] contract renewal.”  (A169a ¶ 29.)  
Shortly thereafter, a Prison Board member told Zaloga that 
“both Segilia and [Mercatili] were upset with [Zaloga’s] 
persistent opposition to their decisions regarding the … [t]ire 
facility and [Zaloga’s] challenge to their nominating petitions, 
and that Segilia and [Mercatili] wanted the Prison Board 
member to oppose [Correctional Care’s] upcoming contract 
renewal.”  (D.I. 156, at 32-33 ¶¶ 102-03.)  Later, a “second 
Prison Board member informed [Zaloga] that Segilia and 
[Mercatili] contacted him and demanded that he also vote 
against the renewal of [Correctional Care’s] contract … in 
exchange for their support for his [i.e., the Board member’s] 
political campaign.”  (D.I. 156, at 33 ¶ 104.)  Sometime 
between April and November 2009, Segilia and Mercatili also 
approached John Szymanski – the Lackawanna County 
Sheriff and a Prison Board member – and told him that “they 
would support [his] campaign for re-election only if [he] 
would oppose Dr. Zaloga’s company’s contract renewal.”  
(A179a ¶ 5 (emphasis in original).) 
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 The record contains several additional instances of 
Segilia and Mercatili purportedly applying political pressure 
on Prison Board members.  The District Attorney for 
Lackawanna County, also a Prison Board member, averred 
that, when discussing Correctional Care’s contract renewal 
with Segilia in 2009, Segila “indicated that he [had] a 
problem with Dr. Zaloga … because of his ongoing legal 
battle in Moosic and because [Zaloga] ‘…attempted to have 
[Segilia and Mercatili] thrown off the ballot.’”  (A175a ¶ 6.)  
According to the District Attorney, “just prior to Correctional 
Care’s medical contract renewal,” another Prison Board 
member told him that Segilia and Mercatili were angry at him 
for “considering a vote in favor of renewing Correctional 
Care’s contract with the Lackawanna County Prison.”  
(A175a ¶ 7.)  The Board member went on to express his 
personal concern that Segilia and Mercatili “would either not 
support him or even work against him in his re-election bid.”  
(A175a ¶ 7.)  The District Attorney himself did not speak 
with Mercatili until after the County had already renewed its 
contract with Correctional Care.   
 
 Ultimately, the County unanimously voted to award 
Correctional Care a three-year contract renewal, and the 
contract was renewed again in 2012.     
 
B. Procedural Background 
 The Plaintiffs filed their first complaint in 2010, and 
subsequently amended it three times.  Count I of the Third 
Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants retaliated in 
response to Zaloga’s exercise of his First Amendment rights.  
Count II says that the Defendants violated the Plaintiffs’ 
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substantive due process and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 
interfering with the Plaintiffs’ reputational, constitutional, and 
property rights.  Finally, Counts III and IV allege that the 
Defendants conspired against the Plaintiffs in violation of 
both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state common law.   
 
 After completion of discovery, the Defendants moved 
for summary judgment.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment on all counts against all Defendants, except for 
Counts I, III, and IV against Mercatili.  As to Mercatili, the 
Court concluded that his assertion of qualified immunity 
hinged upon fact questions that would need to be settled by a 
jury.  
  
 Mercatili appealed.   
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IV. DISCUSSION3 
 
 Qualified immunity shields government actors from 
suit “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme 
Court divided the analysis of qualified immunity into two 
parts:  First, a court considering qualified immunity must ask 
whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to 
the injured party, “show [that] the [government official]’s 
conduct violated a constitutional right”; second, the court 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343.  “[A] district court’s denial of a claim of 
qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of 
law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 … .”  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
530 (1985).  The qualified immunity question implicated in 
this case – namely, whether the law allegedly violated was 
“clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s actions – 
is the type of legal issue immediately appealable as a final 
decision.  In re Montgomery Cty., 215 F.3d 367, 373-74 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction to consider 
that question at this stage of the proceedings.  Our review of a 
district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment is 
plenary.  Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 65 (3d Cir. 2014).  
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving 
party must demonstrate ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.’”  Interstate Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Twp. of Mount Laurel, 706 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting FED R. CIV. P. 56(a)).  
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must ask whether the right was clearly established “in light of 
the specific context of the case, [and] not as a broad general 
proposition.”  533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  Notwithstanding the 
sequence of the Saucier questions, federal courts are 
“permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding 
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis 
should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the 
particular case at hand.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
236 (2009).  Summary judgment based on qualified immunity 
should be granted when “the law did not put the officer on 
notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful.” Saucier, 
533 U.S. at 202.  
 
 Here, the District Court erred in its consideration of 
the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.  We 
therefore do not need to decide whether Mercatili’s actions 
could have violated Zaloga’s constitutional rights, and we 
decline to do so.  Discussing the constitutionality of 
Mercatili’s actions would require us to grapple with the 
tension between his First Amendment right to speak and 
Zaloga’s right to be free of government retaliation.  Because 
the law does not clearly address how to harmonize those 
competing interests, the second Saucier prong is not met and 
any analysis addressing the first prong would “be an 
essentially academic exercise.”  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237.  
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels against 
unnecessarily wading into such muddy terrain.  Cf. id. at 241 
(justifying resolving a dispute solely on the basis of the 
second prong due to “older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass 
on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is 
unavoidable[]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  We thus 
move directly to an explanation of our conclusion with 
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respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis.  
 
A. The “Clearly Established” Standard 
 The standard for qualified immunity is tilted in favor 
of shielding government actors and “gives ample room for 
mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”  
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  To defeat qualified immunity, the 
right purportedly violated must be so clearly established that  
 
every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that 
right.  In other words, existing precedent must 
have placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.  This “clearly 
established” standard … ensur[es] that officials 
can reasonably … anticipate when their conduct 
may give rise to liability for damages. 
Reichle v. Howards, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
brackets omitted); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741 (2011) (explaining that, for the contours of a right to be 
clearly established, “[w]e do not require a case directly on 
point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 
constitutional question beyond debate”).   
 
 Given that exacting standard, it is not surprising that 
some degree of specificity in the law is required before a right 
is said to be “clearly established.”  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stressed that, for purposes of determining whether 
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a right is so well settled as to defeat qualified immunity, it 
“must be established not as a broad general proposition, but in 
a particularized sense so that the contours of the right are 
clear to a reasonable official[.]”  Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Thus, in 
Reichle v. Howards, the Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that a right was clearly established 
merely because that Court’s precedent “settled the rule that, 
as a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits 
government officials from subjecting an individual to 
retaliatory actions for his speech.”  Id. at 2093-94 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court explained that, in the 
fact scenario it faced, “the right in question is not the general 
right to be free from retaliation for one’s speech, but the 
more specific right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is 
otherwise supported by probable cause.”  Id. at 2094 
(emphasis added).  We thus understand that the right should 
be framed in terms specific enough to put “every reasonable 
official” on notice of it, and the more specific the precedent, 
the more likely it is that a right will meet that threshold. 
 
 Especially in light of Reichle, it is not sufficient to 
conclude, as the District Court did in this case, that the second 
Saucier prong is satisfied because there is a well-known 
“right against government retaliation for exercising one[’]s 
right to [free] speech … .”  (A34a.)  That put the question of 
whether the “clearly established” standard had been met at 
much too high a level of abstraction.  Instead, we must attend 
to context; we need to “consider the state of the existing law 
at the time of the alleged violation and the circumstances 
confronting [Mercatili] to determine whether a reasonable 
state actor could have believed his conduct was lawful.”  
12 
 
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 
B. Applying Precedent 
 Our opinion in McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566 
(3d Cir. 2001) – which is the most analogous precedent with 
respect to Mercatili’s alleged actions – effectively precludes 
Zaloga and Correctional Care from arguing that Mercatili’s 
actions violated clearly established law.  The plaintiffs in 
McLaughlin were agents of the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General’s office who alleged (among other things) that the 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania had “acted administratively to influence the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General to take adverse employment-
related action against them.”  Id. at 572.  Assuming arguendo 
that those allegations could constitute a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, id. at 572-73, we nevertheless concluded 
that they did not establish the violation of a clearly 
established right, explaining our reasoning, in part, as 
follows: 
 
When a public official is sued for allegedly 
causing a third party to take some type of 
adverse action against plaintiff’s speech, we 
have held that defendant’s conduct must be of a 
particularly virulent character.  It is not enough 
that defendant speaks critically of plaintiff or 
even that defendant directly urges or influences 
the third party to take adverse action.  Rather, 
defendant must “threaten” or “coerce” the 
third party to act. 
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Id. at 573 (emphasis added).  We ordered dismissal of the 
case on the basis of qualified immunity.  Id. at 574.  
McLaughlin thus suggests that a government official like 
Mercatili would not necessarily understand that mere political 
pushback could be unlawful.   
 
 In that same vein, we cited in McLaughlin, with 
approval, a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit recognizing that, when a public official’s 
allegedly retaliatory acts “are in the form of speech,” the 
official’s “own First Amendment speech rights are 
implicated.”  Id. at 573 (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus. v. 
McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 687 (4th Cir. 2000)).  Mercatili’s 
First Amendment speech rights are likewise implicated here, 
and our cases do not provide government officials with clear 
guidance as to when a government official’s own speech can 
nevertheless constitute unconstitutional retaliation. 
 
 Also important to our analysis in McLaughlin was our 
prior decision in R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 
735 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1984).  In that case, the defendant 
borough council wrote to a third party, Citibank, urging it to 
remove certain commercial billboards and threatening to 
litigate if the billboards were not removed.  Id. at 86-87.  
Citibank acquiesced, admitting that it was motivated, in part, 
by a desire to stay in the borough’s “good graces.”  Id. at 87.  
Afterwards, the plaintiff, who had leased billboard space from 
Citibank, sued the borough for violating the First Amendment 
right to free expression.  We concluded that the borough’s 
actions did not “coerce” the third party sufficiently to be a 
trigger of any constitutional violation.  Id. at 89.  In 
McLaughlin, we read the holding of R.C. Maxwell to mean 
that “strongly urging or influencing, but not ‘coercing[,]’ a 
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third party to take adverse action affecting a plaintiff’s speech 
did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”  271 F.3d at 
573.  We did not elaborate on that distinction, nor did we 
provide specific examples of behavior that would cross the 
line from permissible influence to constitutionally 
impermissible coercion.   
 
 The present case, though, does not appear to involve 
coercion.  Unlike the defendant’s threats in R.C. Maxwell, 
Mercatili’s efforts to pressure members of the Prison Board 
were not even coercive enough to achieve their desired effect.  
By Zaloga’s own admission, none of the Board members 
complied with Mercatili’s wishes by voting against renewal 
of the Borough’s contract with Correctional Care.  Cf. Zherka 
v. Amicone, 634 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir. 2011) (observing that 
in retaliation cases involving “speech against speech” there 
should be a “threshold of measurable harm required to move 
government response to public complaint from the forum of 
free speech into federal court”).  Thus, even if we were to 
characterize Mercatili’s alleged statements to Prison Board 
members as a “threat” to withdraw political support, there is 
ample room to debate whether a reasonable official would 
have known that such threats, without any evident coercive 
power, were constitutionally out of bounds.4   
                                              
4 There may of course be circumstances in which 
political threats carry a potential for coercion that is plain or 
can at least be fairly anticipated.  That may present a different 
case.  But on this record, even viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiffs, it can only be said that Mercatili 
hoped his political horse-trading would get what he wanted, 
not that he had the power to force anything.  
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 Finally, it has never been established that a 
governmental official who does not himself retaliate but 
instead pressures another individual to retaliate – which is the 
position Mercatili is in – can be held personally liable.  At 
least one of our sister circuits has held that there is no liability 
in such circumstances, see Beattie v. Madison Cty. Sch. Dist., 
254 F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 2001) (observing that government 
officials “cannot be liable independently if they did not make 
the final decision”), and another has noted that this remains 
an unsettled question of law, see Trant v. Oklahoma, 754 F.3d 
1158, 1170 n.5 (10th Cir. 2014) (observing that the Fifth 
Circuit has held that “only final decisionmakers may be 
liable” and noting that this is an unsettled question in the 
Tenth Circuit).   
 
 We conclude that legal precedent leaves space for 
good faith disagreement about the constitutionality of 
Mercatli’s alleged actions.  Under the high standard for 
“clearly established” law, that is enough to defeat the 
Plaintiffs’ challenge to qualified immunity.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order denying Mercatili’s motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in his favor. 
